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Although the present rules are unsatisfactory, they do at least protect the
offeree from the offeror's power to revoke. The Dick case may imperil this pro-
tection. By rejecting the contention that the post office is the agent of the
offeror, the court destroyed one common basis for the "letter of acceptance"
rule.20 If the "letter of acceptance" rule is set aside, the rejection situation
can then be handled in a normal manner. The problem of how to allocate the
risk of loss or delay in contracts by correspondence would confront the courts
anew. At its best, the Dick case may perform the service of calling attention
to the need for a firm offer principle.
FURTHER RETREAT FROM THE POLEMIS DOCTRINE
The House of Lords appears to have hammered another nail into the coffin
of the so-called English or "Polemis" rule of proximate cause. Not long after In
re Polemis established the original rule, the high court initiated a course of
qualification and restriction which has now culminated in the recent case of
Monarch S.S. Co. v. A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker.2 Thus the House of Lords has
raised anew the perplexing question of the extent of liability for negligent acts.
In the Monarch case appellant had contracted to ship a cargo of beans to
Sweden prior to World War II. Due to various defects in the vessel which caused
her to be unseaworthy, she was still enroute when war broke out. By Admiralty
orders the ship was diverted to Scotland where the cargo was transhipped
aboard neutral vessels to Sweden. The court allowed the cost of the shipment as
damages, basing the award on the principle of "reasonable contemplation,"
which, apparently, will now replace the "Polemis" rule in the field of torts.
The English retreat from the Polemis doctrine began vith Liesbosch, Dredger
v. Edison S.S.3 There the plaintiffs' dredger was moored in a harbor when the
defendants' steamship fouled the moorings and carried her out to sea, where she
sank and was lost. The plaintiffs had invested all their liquid assets in a contract
undertaking; and, unable to buy their own dredger, they were forced to pay a
high rate of rent on another which was much more expensive to operate. The
plaintiffs included in their claim for damages the loss due to the work stoppage
between the date of the sinking and the hire of the dredger, the extra expense
in renting, and the added expense in operating the rented dredger. Since the de-
down any fraud which the offeror might undertake. Since the offeror signs the return receipt
when he receives the letter of acceptance, he could hardly claim later that he never received
the communication.
20 There is, however, no reason to think that a well-advised court will permit the offeror to
revoke after the letter of acceptance has been mailed.
' [1921] 3 K.B. 56o.
2 [,949] I All E.R. i. See Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 1io; Liesbosch, Dredger v. Edison
S.S., ['9331 A.C. 449; Salmond, Torts 131-137 (ioth ed. 1945).
3 [19331 A.C. 449.
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fendants had admitted liability for the original negligence, the question before
the court was the extent of liability for the wrong. Lord Wright, speaking for
the court, reasoned that the impecuniosity was not traceable to the defendants'
acts. 4 But by failing to relate the ultimate harm only to the defendants' wrong-
ful acts, Lord Wright ignored the plain dictates of the Polemis doctrine. Rather
than posing the question of whether the impecuniosity was an effect of the
wrong, the House of Lords should have phrased the problem in terms of simple
cause and effect. For, under the Polemis rule, a defendant should be responsible
for all of the consequences of his negligence which are in the chain of physical
causation. This approach, as stated in the three cases of Hambrook v. Stokes,s In
re Polemis, 6 and Smith v. London & Southwestern R. Co.7 requires that if there
is a reasonable inference of negligence, and of a causal connection in fact, the
case will go to the jury even if the particular harm complained of was entirely
unforeseeable.' In deciding whether there was a causal connection between the
negligence and the ultimate harm, it must be determined only whether the harm
would not have happened but for the original negligence of the defendant.9
Yet Lord Wright dismissed the Polemis rule as not being relevant to the
Liesbosch situation. "That case," he said, "was concerned with the immediate
physical consequences of the negligent act, and not with the co-operation of an
extraneous matter such as the plaintiffs' want of means."'x It is difficult to un-
derstand what was meant by "immediate physical consequences of the negligent
act," and it is also difficult to see how any test could be formulated to determine
such. If actual cause and effect was meant, then the reasoning leads back to the
"but for" test, which was not applied. But because the House of Lords termed
the impecuniosity a "separate and concurring cause, extraneous to and distinct
in character from the tort,"' , the defendant in the Liesbosch case was not liable
for harm resulting from this factor. Such a conclusion was made possible by
employing the familiar technique of "intervening agency." However, in failing
to treat the impecuniosity as an existing "condition," even this approach was
incorrectly applied. Since a "condition" would depend upon the defendant's
conduct to become active, and thus harmful, no new agency can be said to have
intervened and have insulated him from liability.12 It would appear that the
plaintiffs' impecuniosity in the Liesbosch case was such a condition and, there-
fore, did not intervene to break the chain of cause and effect. The Liesbosch
problem was but another variant of Lord Blackburn's hypothetical case: "[I]f a
4 Ibid., at 460. 6 (1921] 3 K.B. 560.
S [1925] I K.B. 41. 7 L.R. 5 C.P. 98 (1870).
8 Gregory, Proximate Cause-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 36,
43 (1938).
9 Ibid., at 47; Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 180-84 (1937); Bohlen, Studies in the
Law of Torts 7 (1926).
10 [1933] A.C. 449, 461.
1 11933] A.C. 449, 461. 12 Harper, Torts § 113, 116 (1933).
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person fires across a road when it is dangerous to do so and kills a man who is
in receipt of a large income, he will be held liable for the whole damage, however
great, that may have resulted to his family and cannot set up that he could not
have reasonably expected to have injured anyone but a laborer"13
If the Liesbosch case foreshadowed the abandonment of the Polemis doctrine,
the dictum in the Monarch case seems to be a fulfillment of that prophecy. For
the English court made special effort to discuss a rule of damages, applicable to
both contract and tort, in a case which could easily have been decided on ordi-
nary principles of contract liability. Lord Wright phrased the issues thus: "In
the Liesbosch case it was held that loss due to impecuniosity was too remote,
and, therefore, to be neglected in the calculation of damages. It was special loss
due to financial position. A different conclusion was arrived at in Mohammed
Issa el Sheikh Ahmad v. Al,... where damages consequent on impecuniosity
were held not too remote, because, as I understand, the loss was such as might
reasonably be expected to be in the contemplation of the parties."'4 Since the
remoteness of impecuniosity was in question in both of these cases, the different
results cannot be based on a theory of actual causation, but rather seem to be
based on the theory of "reasonable contemplation."'s In view of the fact that
on its merits the Monarch case hardly warranted review by the House of Lords,
the full effect of such a dictum cannot be underestimated.
Generally, the rules and doctrines relating to proximate cause are mainly to
determine whether liability exists at all. But, as in the Liesbosch situation, they
are also used in deciding questions of damage-that is, questions of responsi-
bility for particular items of loss or injury.,6 Thus, in the final analysis, the
question of proximate cause in this situation is one of the extension of liability
for a negligent act. Perhaps the court in the Monarch case was looking for a
more practical test in the rule of "reasonable contemplation."'? But the "rea-
sonable contemplation" doctrine strongly resembles the so-called "Pennsylva-
nia" rule of proximate cause, which tests only whether the ultimate or particular
harm in question itself was foreseeable, probable, and natural. Such a test not
only repudiates the Polemis rule but is as extreme in prohibiting liability as the
Polemis rule was in granting it. More than a repudiation, the Monarch case may
support complete reversal of a traditional policy of tort liability.
Even though the "but for" test has been regarded as fairly clearcut, under-
standable and easy to apply," the English court in the Liesbosch case found it
necessary to enter into a discussion of intervening agency in order to limit the
near-absolute liability which the test would have demanded."9 Swayed by con-
X3 Smith v. London & Southwestern R. Co., L.R. 5 C.P. 98 (1870).
14 11949] i All E.R. 1, 14. 6 McCormick, Damages § 72 (1935).
IS See Note, 64 L.Q. Rev. 2 (1948). X7 See Note, 65 L.Q. Rev. 1 ('949).
s Gregory, Proximate Cause-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 36,
47 (1938).
9 See 38 L.Q. Rev. 6S (1922).
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siderations of equity, the House of Lords resorted to such an evasion
in order to mitigate the harshness of the Polemis rule. Under a more rational
approach to the question of the extension of liability such devices would not
have been necessary. A test similar to that proposed by Judge Cardozo in Pals-
graf v. Long Island R. Co.2° does not demand any speculation on the question of
intervening agency or conditions, and is an intermediate position between the
theoretical statement of the English view and its opposite, the Pennsylvania
view-the apparent logical end result of the "reasonable contemplation" test.
If Judge Cardozo's "risk" or "hazard" approach had been applied in the
Liesbosch case, the only question for the judge would be whether the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff was within the orbit of the foreseeable hazard or risk cre-
ated by the defendants' negligence. Such a test, based on the element of foresee-
ability, may not appear so mechanical, but it would avoid philosophical specu-
lation.
Perhaps the dictum in the Monarch case is indicative of a tendency in English
law to place the question of proximate cause on a more rational basis, since the
element of foreseeability plays a greater part. The determination of the extent
of liability for a negligent act depends, in part, on certain values and concepts
of social policy held by the court. An attempt to limit the liability under a rule
based on actual causation, as in the Liesbosch case, led the court into a discus-
sion of the concept of intervening agency, which submerged the question of
policy. A test based on foreseeability or on reasonable contemplation necessarily
makes room for the values and concepts of social policy held by the judge. A
question of what is reasonably foreseeable is not only based on the judge's past
experience, but also on notions of what should be, and thus on policy considera-
tions.21
Perhaps the "reasonable contemplation" test, as enunciated in the Monarch
case, will place the law of damages in negligence on a more practical and ration-
al basis, if the end result will be a position similar to the intermediate "Cardozo"
view. But if the final conclusion will be analagous to the "Pennsylvania" view,
the English courts will have done an "about face" and exchanged one extreme
position for another equally as extreme.
JURISDICTION OF STATES UNDER BLUE-SKY LAWS
Travelers Health Association, incorporated under the laws of Nebraska with
its home office in Omaha, had in force in Virginia approximately eight hundred
membership certificates providing health insurance protection. The association
never had any office, agent or property in Virginia. The customary method for
soliciting new memberships was for existing members to recommend to the
20248 N.Y. 339, i62 N.E. 99 (1928).
2t Gregory, Proximate Cause-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
36, 51 (1938).
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association likely prospects who were then by mail invited to apply for member-
ship. An interested prospect would fill out an application blank and mail it to
the Omaha office. After acceptance of the application there, a membership cer-
tificate would be returned to him by mail, subject to his approval. The Virginia
State Corporation Commission charged the association with selling securities
without procuring a permit from the commission as required by the Virginia
Blue-Sky Law.' After service of process by registered mail, the association
through its attorneys appeared specially before the commission for the sole pur-
pose of contesting the jurisdiction of the state. The association contended it had
conducted no business activities within Virginia, but had transacted its entire
business outside the state through the mails, and that service of process by regis-
tered mail was therefore insufficient. Concluding that the activities of the associ-
ation violated the Blue-Sky Law and were sufficient to bring it within the juris-
diction of the state, the commission ordered the association to cease and desist
from offering, promoting or selling further certificates in Virginia without the
required permit. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court sustained the jurisdic-
tion of the commission and the sufficiency of the service. Travelers Health Ass'n
v. Commonwealth.2
This case raised the problem of what contacts a foreign business must have
with a state to be subject to the jurisdiction of the state to regulate and the
jurisdiction of the state courts and administrative agencies to enforce such regu-
lation. While the general problem is a familiar one, the instant case presented
the borderline situation of a business conducted by an interstate medium of
communication without physical entry into the state. The decision applied the
broad doctrine proclaimed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington that a foreign
corporation may be subject to the jurisdiction of a state whenever its operations
have established sufficient contacts with the state to make the jurisdiction rea-
sonable and just according to traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. The present decision, furthermore, was an extension of the idea that
jurisdiction may be based on conduct having probable serious consequences
within the state, such contact making state action for the protection of its
citizens reasonable. Practical complications which may result from these exten-
sions also are suggested by the decision.
In view of the broad jurisdictional requirement laid down in the International
Shoe decision, the outcome of the present case is not startling. The Virginia
Supreme Court was able to base jurisdiction on four contacts with the state:
(i) encouragement and ratification by the association of the activities of its
members within the state in soliciting new members, (2) investigations of claims
made within the state, (3) remittance of benefits within the state, and (4) final
' Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 3848(47)-(66).
2 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E. 2d 263 (1949), probable jurisdiction noted, 69 S. Ct. 1496 (1949).
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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acceptance of the offer of membership within the state.4 Unlike the defendant in
the International Shoe situation, however, the defendant in the present case had
no legally constituted agents soliciting within the state.
In arriving at its decision, the court made a departure from a 1923 ruling of
the United States Supreme Court in the closely similar case of Minnesota Corn-
mercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn.s In that case all the above contacts, except possibly
the fourth, were present. Yet such activities were held not to constitute doing
business within the state sufficient for jurisdiction to award a judgment by
default after service of process on the Secretary of State in accordance with a
Montana insurance statute. Wbile the Benn case had been distinguished in a
recent federal mail-order insurance decision,6 as recently as 1947 the Missouri
Supreme Court in a similar mail-order insurance case, without mention of the
International Shoe case, relied on the doing-business requirement of the Benn
case to deny jurisdiction.7Although the activities of the association in the pres-
ent case could hardly have been better tailored to fit the situation in the Benn
case, it was distinguished by the Virginia court on the tenuous basis that the
action there was for a pecuniary civil judgment while in the present case it was
of a "quasi-criminal" nature.
The circumvention of the Benn decision is an indication that state courts are
willing to abandon old concepts of doing business which were set up as require-
ments for jurisdiction prior to the International Shoe case. In order to ignore the
United States Supreme Court precedent in the Benn case, which had lost most of
its force as a result of the International Shoe decision, the present opinion re-
sorted to some window dressing of questionable value. The court, for example,
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Merrick v. Halsey & Co.,,
which upheld the constitutionality of application of a Michigan :Blue-Sky Law
against certain foreign businesses, including a partnership which had solicited
stock purchases within the state by mail. The decision is, however, far from con-
dusive in the present case because, among other reasons, the question of juris-
diction for service of process was not at issue.9 A still weaker basis for the present
4 This last was an attempt to show that Virginia was the place of contracting, i.e., the place
of the last act necessary to the completion of the contract. I Williston, Contracts § 97 (1936).
In the case of insurance contracts, however, this is usually the place where the acceptance of
the application for insurance is mailed. Richards, Insurance § 76 (i932). Even though the in-
sured could reject the certificate in the present case, it would seem that the latter rule should
determine the place of contracting if coverage is provided from the time of mailing of the ac-
ceptance.
S 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
6 Storey v. United Insurance Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (1946). There the statute providing for
service of process on the secretary of state in effect defined doing business as delivery of poli-
des, and the policies involved there had stipulated that they would not be in force until de-
livery.
7 Cindrich v. Indiana Travelers Assurance Co., 356 Mo. xo64, 204 S.W. 2d 765 (1947).
8 242 U.S. 568 (i9i7).
9 The partnership had intervened voluntarily.
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decision was the argument by the court that the commission, under another
section of the statute, could probably have obtained extradition of the defend-
ant upon information or indictment, and it therefore had jurisdiction to serve
process by registered mail. This conclusion is not only a non sequitur, but is
based on a premise which assumes the validity of a statutory provision on
which there may be some question.
A more sound basis for jurisdiction for service of process was founded on the
inherently serious consequences of the defendant's activity. At the outset the
court was careful to point out that the regulation of the promotion and sale of
securities is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. Service by regis-
tered mail to enforce such regulation was analogized to the well-established
practice under nonresident motorist statutes approved in Hess v. Pawloski.'
This analogy can be supported by Doherty & Co. v. Goodman" which recognized
the exceptional nature of the business of dealing in corporate securities and held
valid the service of process on a nonresident dealer by service on an agent
within the state without actual personal service. The present decision, however,
goes farther than either of these cases, since neither the defendant nor the de-
fendant's agents entered the state, and the conduct was carried on principally
from without the state.
Strong support for the outcome of the present case can be found in decisions
on the problem of whether a state has power to apply its regulations to a foreign
corporation. The two problems are practically indistinguishable. Both the exist-
ence of jurisdiction and of the power to regulate depend upon the amount of
contacts the foreign corporation has with the state, and in either case a broad
test is now applied by the United States Supreme Court. Thus in Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen*2 a foreign insurance company was held subject to regula-
tion by New York even though the company had no agents, offices or property
within the state, and the formalities of the transactions were carried on by mail
from Chicago. There the power to regulate was determined by the location of
activity prior and subsequent to the making of the contract, and by the degree
of interest of the regulating state in the object insured. Theories of place of con-
tract or performance, which had become involved in earlier determinations of
the power of a state to apply its own regulatory laws to insurance business ac-
tivities, were brushed aside as "conceptualistic." In place of those factors the
Court substituted the more realistic considerations laid down in Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission: 3 the protection of the citizen insured
and the protection of the state from the incidents of loss. The Hoopeston deci-
sion, consequently, has considerably weakened the line of cases based on
Allgeyer v. Louisiana,r4 which had excused mail-order insurance from regulation
10 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
" 294 U.S. 623 (r935). ' 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
12318 U.S. 313 (1943). 14 365 U.S. 578 (1897).
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because the contracts were not made within the state and business was not
being done within the state.
Thus it can be seen that there has been a parallel relaxation of requirements
both for regulation and for jurisdiction. The trend is toward increasing the dis-
cretion of the states, restrained only by the vague limit of reasonableness.
Should the trend be universally followed, there would be little possibility left for
foreign corporations to sell securities to citizens of a state and still avoid its
Blue-Sky or other regulatory laws.'5 While it was possible in the present case for
the court to rely on several "activities" within the state, it would seem from
the Hoopeston decision that the mere fact that the purchasers were within the
state should be the essential factor. The seriousness of the possible consequences
to securities purchasers would contribute to this result. Place of contracting,
6
presence of the defendant within the state, 7 and implied consent 8 are no longer
controlling factors. It may be inferred, moreover, that jurisdiction would be
recognized over individuals or partnerships engaged in activities similar to those
in the present case, since the decision placed no reliance on the fact that the
seller was a corporation. 19 In the application of Blue-Sky Laws this is of special
importance since dealers in securities frequently fall into the former two cate-
gories.
The wide discretion being given to the states is desirable if the states are to
protect their citizens effectively. Under the old requirement of doing business
or of making contracts, it was a simple matter for a business to escape undesir-
able regulation by arranging the formalities of transactions outside the state.2 °
Since Nevada has no Blue-Sky Law,2 ' and since several states merely provide
remedies for fraud,2 2 states requiring licensing pf dealers and registration of se-
is A probable exception would be where the purchase was completely carried out by a
broker-agent physically outside the state and where none of the solicitation or negotiation was
within the state. Compare Jones v. Re Mine Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 832,119 P. 2d 219 (1941).
z6 Basis for decision in Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
17 Basis for decision in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579. (914).
x
8 Basis for decision in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404 (856).
'9 Jurisdiction could be based on the "dangerous activity" concept of Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (i927), and Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), without regard to the
form of the business organization. The inference that partnerships and individuals would be
similarly subject to jurisdiction is also supported by the reliance the court placed on Merrick v.
N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917), which it interpreted as holding that a state may
regulate a foreign partnership selling securities within the state by mail.
20 In hearings on the Federal Securities Act this method of avoidance was cited as one of the
reasons why federal regulation was needed. Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73rd Cong. ist Sess., at ioo-oi (933).
21 Ile District of Columbia has no Blue-Sky Law as such, the Securities Act of 1933 being
the principal legislation.
-The Delaware Act is an example. Del. Rev. Code (i935) § 4369.
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curitiesF3 might well feel that the regulation provided by sister states would be
inadequate.
This award of discretion to the states, nevertheless, carries with it certain
potential drawbacks. As a result of the lack of uniformity in state regulations,
the legality of the same method of conducting business may be inconsistently
determined in different states. In the case of Blue-Sky Laws, the handling of
securities issues may be accompanied by additional delay and expense as a re-
sult of registration and qualification requirements in many states. In states
where the demand for new issues is not great, this delay and expense may keep
out otherwise acceptable issues.
While the result in the present case may be necessary for effective state regu-
lation of securities sales, there remains the question of whether, in view of the
above disadvantages, it is desirable to have such regulation in the hands of the
states at all where transactions affecting more than one state are involved. In
early cases attacking state Blue-Sky Laws as an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court upheld the legislation as
a valid exercise of the states' police power.4 While the unreasonableness of the
burden has thus been denied, the existence of some burden must be admitted.
Moreover, whenever transactions involve elements from more than one state, as
in the present case, any civil litigation for recission arising therefrom may
present a choice-of-laws problem. Cases in which this problem has been raised
have produced a variety of conflicting rules as to what law should govem.2 s
Regulation by the states perpetuates this uncertainty and lack of uniformity.
Exclusive federal regulation of securities sales would eliminate the cost and
delay of complying with many state laws and would give interstate securities
dealers a uniform regulation, while still providing the necessary protection to
purchasers. Unfortunately, the present Federal Securities Act does not accom-
plish these objectives.26 First, it explicitly provides that nothing in the act shall
affect the jurisdiction of any state securities commission.27 Thus instead of sim-
plifying securities regulation, the act has complicated it still further. Overlap-
ping state regulation could be eliminated by a provision that any state regula-
tion on any subject covered by the federal act shall be superseded thereby. A
second shortcoming of the federal act is that it does not provide all the protec-
tion for purchasers which might be desired. Thus a recent narrow interpretation
2'The Ohio and Illinois Acts are examples. Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1948)
§ 8624(1)-49; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 1211, §§ 96-137.
'4 The Blue-Sky cases. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (i917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
2 SDetermination of the Validity of Interstate Transactions: State Blue-Sky Laws, Sr
Harv. L. Rev. i55 (1937); Liability for Interstate Sales of Securities under State Blue-Sky
Laws, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 95 (1942).
26 48 Stat. 74-92 (1933) , 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(a)-(aa) (I94i).
27 48 Stat. 85 (i933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(r) (1941).
388 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
of the federal act by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the
protection of the act to a purchaser where the misrepresentations sued on were
made neither by means of some interstate method of communication nor by
means of the mails, although the transaction came within the purview of the act
in other respects.28 This defect could be overcome by a provision that civil and
penal remedies shall be available for any misrepresentation made by any means
and in any connection with a sale of securities by means of interstate com-
munication or of the mails.
But the securities selling industry probably would find exclusive control in
the federal government more distasteful than inconsistent state regulation. Fur-
thermore, wide divergence exists as to what exclusive federal regulations should
contain. Therefore perhaps the most satisfactory solution that can be hoped for
would be the inclusion of provisions in the state acts requiring state administra-
tive agencies to accept for their mechanical requirements copies of documents
prepared pursuant to the federal act, and requiring exercise of regulatory powers
on the basis of information therein.29
It seems likely that the zeal of the state courts for protecting state citizens
will cause these courts to follow the lead of the Virginia court in the present
case and take full advantage of the wide discretion given them in the Inter-
national Shoe and Hoopeston decisions. Pending disposition of the present case
by the Supreme Court of the United States may settle the matter.30 As it stands,
in the absence of the suggested federal legislation or of specific exemptions in the
state acts, dealers in interstate securities transactions by mail, telephone or
telegraph probably will be forced to comply with the Blue-Sky Laws of every
state in which they have purchasers. The result will be the exercise by the states
of a significant portion of the power delegated to Congress by the Constitution
of the United States to regulate commerce among the states.3'
LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY: SUBSTANCE
OR PROCEDURE?
According to early maritime codes and the subsequent general maritime law,
the liability of a shipowner was limited to his interest in the ship.' But since the
nineteenth century decline of the general maritime law, diverse methods of com-
28 Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F. 2d 44 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
29 Compare the present Indiana provisions. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, i933) § 25-836(cc).
30 Probable jurisdiction has been noted and the case transferred to the summary docket.
69 S. Ct. 1496 (1949).
3X U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
z The Consolato del Mare, probably compiled by private individuals in the Middle Ages by
order of the kings of Aragon, "expressly limits the liability of the part owner to the value of
his share in the ship." The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894). This code eventually
"became the common law of all the commercial powers of Europe." 3 Kent Comm. zo; see
The Rebecca, 2o Fed. Ca's. 373, No. ir, 61g (D.C. Me., 1831).
